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[Crim. No. 11700. In Bank. Mar. 4, 1968.]

In re ROBERT LEE MURDOCK on Habeas Corpus.
[1] AutomobUes-01fenses-DriviDg When License Suspended.A driver who has no actual knowledge that his license has
been suspended or revoked by the Motor Vehicle Department
cannot be guilty of violating Veh. Code, § 14601, prohibiting
a person from driving on the highway when he "has knowledge of" such suspension or revocation.
[2] Habeas Oorpus-GroundB for Belief-Detention for Acts not
Oonstituting Orime.-Habeas corpus was the proper remedy
for one held in custody after being found guilty of a misdemeanor under the Vehicle Code, where there was no material
dispute as to the facts, where the relevant statute did not prohibit the conduct for which he was convicted, and where the
appellate department of the superior court affirmed the judgment without opinion and refused to certify the case to the
Court of Appeal.
[3] Automobiles-01fenses-DriviDg When License Suspended.A driver had no "knowledge" of the suspension of his license,
within the meaning of Veh. Code, § 14601, prohibiting a person
[3] See Oal.Jur.2d, Rev., Automobiles, § 135; Am.Jur.2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 127.
Melt. Dig. References! [1, 3] Automobiles and Other Road Vehicles, § 387a; [2] Habeas Corpus, § 14; [4] Statutes, § 118.
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from driving on the highwny when he "has knowledge of" the
suspension or revocation of his license, and he was wrongly
convicted thereunder, where, following nn accident, his license
had been suspended under Veh. Code, § 16080, for failure to
deposit the required security, where notice of suspension
had been mailed to him by the 1I10tor Vehicle Department in
accordance with Veh. Code, §§ 22, 23, but sent to the address
he l1ad given on his accident report, from which he had moved
without arranging with the post office for the forwarding (If
his mail, and where, although he had later registered his car
at his new addres!', he had failed otherwise to notify the department of the change as required by Veh. Code, § 14600,
subd. (a), and first learned of the suspension after being arrested for speeding about seven months after such registration.
[4] Sta.tutes - Construction - Penal Statutes. - When language
which is reasonably susceptible of two construct~ons is used
in a pennI law, ordinarily that construction which is more
favorable to the offender will be adopted, particularly where
one of the proposed constructions would impose absolute criminal liability.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from
custody. Writ granted .
. Goth, Dennis & Aaron and Gerald M. Schneider for Petitioner.
Thomas C. I,yncll, Attorney General, Derald E. Granberg
and Joyce F. Nedde, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
TRA YNOR, C. J.-Petitioner was convicted in a municipal
court of driving an automobile with knowledge that his
driver's license had bern suspended. (Yeh. Code, § 14601.)1
The nppellatc department of the superior court affirmed the
condetion without opinion and refused to certify the case to
the COl,lrt of Appeal. Petitioner then sought a writ of habeas
corpus in the Court of Appeal, and after that court denied his
p~,titiol1, he sougllt relirf in this court. We issued an order to
[4] See Ca1.Jur.2d. Statute:;, § 187; Am.Jur., Statutes (1st ed
§ 407 et seq).
1" (a) No person shnll drive a motor vehicle upon a higbway at any
time when his driving privilege is suspended or revoked and the person
so driving has knowlcdge of either such fact.
"Any person convicted under tbis section shall be punished upon a
first conviction by imprisonment in the county jail for not more tban s~
montlls OT by fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) or by
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show cause and ordered petitioner released on his own recognizance pending our decision herein.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. In October 1964 petitioner was issued a California driver's license listing his
address at that time. On November 10, 1965, he was involved
in an automobile accident. Before then he hllo. movcd and
failed to notify the Motor Vehicle Department of his new
address as required by Vehicle Code section 14600, subdivision (a).2 Petitioner listed his correct address on thc accident
report, however, and on January 17, 1966, the department
mailed a notice of license suspension to him at that address. 3
Since petitioner had moved again after the accident and
failed to notify the department of his change of address, the
notice was not delivered but was returned to the department
marked "Moved, Left No Address." On October 7, 1966,
petitioner was arrested for speeding and was thereafter
charged with speeding and driving with knowledge that his
license had been suspended. Although he had registered his
automobile at his correct address on March 1B, 1966, at no
time before trial had he notified the department of a change
of address appiicable to his driver's license, and he did not
learn that his license had been suspended until after his arrest
for speeding. The court found him not guilty of speeding but
guilty of driving with knowledge that his license had been
suspended.
[1] The sole question presented in this proceeding is
whether a driver who has no actual knowledge that his license
both such fine and imprisonment and upon a second or any subsequent
conviction, within seven years of a prior conviction, by imIlrisonment in
the county jail for not less than five days nor more than one year and by
fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by both such fine
and imprisonment.
" (b) If any person is convicted of a second or subsequent offense
under this section within seven years of a prior ('onviction and is granted
probation, it must be a condition of probation that such person be con·
fined in jail for at least five days."
2" Whenever any person after applying for or receiving a driver'M
license moves, or acquires a new address different from t.he address shown
in the application or in the licenMe issu('d to him, he shall within 10 day~
thereafter notify the department in writing of his old and new address.' ,
sThe suspension was ordered pursuant to Vehicle Code, section 16080,
which provides: "Whenever a driver has failed within 50 days after an
accident to establish his exemption from security and has failed to deposit
security within 10 days ufter notiee by the department specifying the
amount of security, the department shall suspend the privilege of the
driver to drive a motor v",hicle, including the driving privi1l'ge of a nonresident of this St.ate. The suspension shall become effective not latH
than the seventy-sixth day after receipt of the accident report by the
department.' ,
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has been suspended or revoked by the department can be
guilty of violating section 14601. We hold that he cannot.
[2] Since there is no material dispute as to the facts, and
the statute under which petitioner was convicted does not
prohibit his conduct, habeas corpus is a proper remedy. (I'll, re
Zerbe (1964) 60 Ca1.2d 666, 668 [36 Cal.Rptr. 286, 388 P.2d
182,10 A.L.R.3d 840].)
[3] The Attorney General contends that constructive
knowledge is sufficient to meet the requirement of section
14601. He urges that when the department gives notice of a
license suspension by mail pursuant to sections 22 and 23 of
the Vehicle Code,· the licensee has knowledge of the suspension within the meaning of section 14601, at least when, as in
this case, he has failed to notify the department of his change
of address or effectively to arrange for the forwarding of his
mail by. the post office. II The cases cited in support of this
position dea~ with different statutes and different issues and
are therefore not helpful.
The Legislature has clearly distinguished between the misdemeanor of failure to notify the! department of a change of
address and the misdemeanor of driving with knowledge of a
license suspension or revocation, and it has provided greater
penalties for the latter crime. 6 If a notice of suspension that
failed to notify because the licensee had moved were sufficient
to constitute knowledge within the meaning of section 14601,
the licensee would be subject to the punishment prescribed by
that section, not because he flaunted its prohibition, but
because he was antecedently guilty of another lesser offense.
Such an anomaly would be wholly inconsistent with the Legislature's requirement of knowledge in other provisions of the
code. 7 We are convinced that had the Legislature meant con.Section 22: "Whenever notice is required to be given under this code
by a department or any division, officer, or employee thereof, such notice
shall be given either l'y personal delivery to the persons to be notified
or by mailing notice, postage prepaid, addressed t.J such person at his
address as shown by the records of the department." Section 23:
". . . The giving of notice by mail is complete upon the expiration of
four days after deposit of the r.otice in the mail. . .. "
liThe evidence is in dispute concerning whether petitioner filed a change
of address form with the post office on November 12, 1965, but in this
habeas corpus proceeding we must resolve that dispute against petitioner.
0In addition to the penalty applicable to violr.tions of both Vehicle
Code section 14600 and section 14601 (see Veh. Code, §§ 40000, 42002)
a violator of section 14601 is subject to a more severe sentence on second
offense (Veh. Code, § 14601), impoundment of his automobile (Veh. Code,
§ 14602) and additional points leading to denial of renewal of license
(Veh. Code, § 12810).
7Section 14601 forbids driving with "knowledge" that one's license
has been suspended or revoked; section 14606 forbids "knowingly"
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structive knowledge to be the equivalent of actual knowledge,
it would have said so.
Our construction of section 14601 is in accord with the
decisions in other states construing similar statutes. (People
v. Shapiro (1958) 4 N.Y.2d 597 [176 N.Y.S.2d 632, 152
N.E.2d 65, 69 A.L.R.2d 973]; Commonwealth v. Sabean
(1931) 275 Mass. 546 [176 N.E. 523] ; City of Cincinnati v.
Christy (Ohio, Ct. App. 1966) 7 Ohio App.2d 46 [36 Ohio
Ops.2d 123,219 N.E.2d 45].) Moreover, even if the language
of the statute, "and the person so driving has knowledge" of
the suspension of his license, could reasonably be construed to
include constructive knowledge, we would still reach the same
result, for a construction requiring actual knowledge is at
l!*lSt as reasonable. [4] "When language which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions is used in a penal law
ordinarily that construction which is more favorable to the
offender will be adopted." (People v. Ralph (1944) 24 Cal.2d
575,581 [150 P.2d 401].) "This rule is particularly pertinent
here, where one of the proposed constructions' would impose
absolute criminal liability. . . . " (People v. Stuart (1956) 47
Ca1.2d 167, 175 [302 P.2d 5, 55 A.L.R.2d 705] ; see also, In re
Tartar (1959) 52 Ca1.2d 250, 257 [339 P.2d 553] ; People v.
Smith (1955) 44 Ca1.2d 77, 79 [279 P.2d 33]; People v.
Valentine (1946) 28 Ca1.2d 121,143 [169 P.2d 1].)
The writ is granted, and the petitioner is discharged from
custody.
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Burke, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred.
MOSK, J.-I dissent.
The petitioner insists he had no actual knowledge that his
license had been suspended; the Attorney General maintains
constructive knowledge is sufficient. I would hold that petitioner had actual knowledge of sufficient relevant facts for the
invocation of Vehicle Code section 14601.
Petitioner knew that on November 10, 1965, he was involved
in an automobile accident. He knew, or should have known,

---------_._-----------permitting an unlicensed perSOll to drive one's automobile; section 14607
forbids "knowingly al10wing an unlicensed child to drive one's auto·
mobile; and section 14610, subdivision (b) forbids "knowingly" per.
mitting the use of one '8 driver's license by another. In contrast, section
14603 forbids driving in violation of restrictions on a license; section
14604 forbids employment of an :mlicenlled chauffeur; and section 14608
forbids renting an automobile to I.n unlicensed driver.
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that Vehicle Code section 16080 requires a driver "within 50
days after an accident to establish his exemption from
security." lIe knew that he did not do so. He knew, or should
have known, that upon failure to do so the Department of
Motor Vehicles is mandatorily compelled to suspend his privilege to drive a motor vehicle; that the suspension shall become
effective not later than the 76th day after receipt of the accident report by the department, and that reports are filed with
the department on or before the 5th of the month following
the accident. (Veh. Code, § 20008, subd. (a).)
Thus, by a process of simple mathematical computation this
petitioner knew that no later than 76 days after December 5,
1965, his license was suspended pursuant to process of law.
With that knowledge he nevertheless continued, with apparEmt unconcern, to operate his vehicle.
I find unconvincing petitioner's contention that he is
aosolvcd from consequences of the foregoing knowledge by
virtue of his admitted violation of still another statute,
Vehicle Code section 14600, subdivision ·(a) : failure to notify
the department of his change of address. Under his interpretation, one who moves frequently and fails to! comply with
section 14600, subdivision (a), can indefinitely ayoid responsibility under sections 16080, 14601, and others requiring either
notice 'or knowledge. In my opinion, the Legislature did not
intend such fortuitous enforcement of statutes designed to
promote safety on the highways.
I would deny the writ.
McComb, J., concurred.

